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A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, 
imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we 
show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of 
obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose 
identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct 
experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the 
Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior. 
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comments. 1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Vega-Redondo (1997) shows how imitation of successful
behavior can push agents towards very competitive outcomes. Speci￿cally,
he shows that in Cournot games imitation of the most successful strategies
leads in the long run to the Walrasian outcome where price is equal to
marginal cost.1 This result is important since Cournot games not only
serve as the main workhorse model for industrial organization but re￿ ect,
more generally, environments where there is a tension between cooperation
and competition, with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome somewhere
in between perfect collusion and perfect competition.
Two experimental papers (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999 and Of-
ferman, Potters, and Sonnemans, 2002) con￿rm the behavioral relevance of
Vega-Redondo￿ s (1997) ￿ndings. When experimental subjects have access
to information that allows them to imitate their rivals, competition gets
signi￿cantly more intense. This is true even when subjects have all the nec-
essary information to play the Nash equilibrium. In fact, both papers show
that while subjects converge to Cournot-Nash if they have just the neces-
sary information to play a best reply, additional information about rivals￿
choices and performance￿ which orthodox game theory deems irrelevant￿
leads them away from equilibrium play towards more competitive outcomes.2
In this paper we re-examine both, Vega-Redondo￿ s (1997) theoretical re-
sult and the experimental ￿ndings on it. First, we show that Vega-Redondo￿ s
theoretical result is surprisingly fragile. Slightest di⁄erences in costs are
shown to have a huge impact on the long-run behavior of agents.3 Specif-
ically, we show that for an arbitrarily small change in some agent￿ s ￿xed
1See Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005) for a generalization of the result to a broader class
of games.
2Since then this link between information, imitation and competition has been repli-
cated in a number of papers. See, for example, Abbink and Brandts (2007), Huck, Nor-
mann, and Oechssler (2000), or Selten and Apesteguia (2005). See also Apesteguia, Huck,
and Oechssler (2007) who analyse, both, theoretically and experimentally, the di⁄erences
between Vega-Redondo￿ s (1997) model of imitation and Schlag￿ s (1998).
3Tanaka (1999) studies imitation among ￿rms with di⁄erent (increasing) marginal
costs. However, since in his setting, ￿rms imitate only ￿rms with the same cost structure,
the long run outcome is still such that price equals marginal costs for each ￿rm.
1costs, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played
some fraction of the time in the long run if the grid size of the action set
is small enough. The intuition for this is simple. If a ￿rm with a slight
￿xed cost advantage moves to a slightly di⁄erent quantity, it will, due to its
cost advantage, still be the most successful ￿rm and will thus be copied by
others.
We also show that this theoretical result is not only a curiosity that
occurs in the limit. Rather we ￿nd in a series of simulations that small
di⁄erences in agents￿costs have large e⁄ects on their pro￿ts if they imitate
most of the time but experiment with a reasonable frequency. Speci￿cally,
we report that when one ￿rm has a slight cost advantage, industry pro￿ts
rise by more than 35% for experimentation rates of 10% or 20%.
Second, we conduct new experiments to analyze whether such cost di⁄er-
entials also change behavior of subjects in the laboratory. Our ￿ndings are
very clear-cut. Despite implementing a non-trivial cost di⁄erential, we ￿nd
no change in outcomes. When subjects can observe their rivals, outcomes
are far more competitive than predicted by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
regardless of whether there are di⁄erences in costs or not. This con￿rms
the strong behavioral link between feedback about rivals (￿market trans-
parency￿ ) and competitive behavior.
2 Theoretical predictions
As in Vega￿ Redondo￿ s (1997) model, we consider a market for an homoge-
neous good where a set of ￿rms N = f1;:::;ng is competing Æ la Cournot.
Each ￿rm i produces some quantity qi. The vector of quantities by ￿rms
other than i is denoted by q￿i: In line with the prior literature, we assume
for technical reasons that ￿rms choose their output from a common grid
￿ = f0;￿;2￿;:::;v￿g with ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 N. The total quantity Q =
Pn
i=1 qi
produced by all ￿rms determines the price on the market via a linear inverse
demand function p(Q) = maxfa￿bQ;0g. We assume that all ￿rms face con-
stant marginal costs c with 0 ￿ c < a. In addition, we assume that ￿rm i
may have to bear some ￿xed cost (or bonus) fi. So ￿rm i￿ s cost function is
2given by ci(qi) = cqi + fi. The ￿xed costs may di⁄er among ￿rms. Pro￿ts
of ￿rm i are given by
￿i(qi;q￿i) = (p(Q) ￿ c)qi ￿ fi: (1)
The (symmetric) Walrasian quantity qw is de￿ned as the quantity at which
price equals marginal cost c when all ￿rms produce the same quantity.





We assume that qw 2 ￿, i.e. the Walrasian quantity is contained in the
quantity grid.
After each period t = 1;2;::: each ￿rm observes the quantities produced
and the pro￿ts associated with these quantities of all ￿rms in the market.
It then chooses the quantity that yielded the highest pro￿t in the previous
period. That is, we are considering an imitate the best max rule.4 More
formally, in period t ￿rm i chooses
qt
i = qt￿1






Ties are assumed to be broken randomly. In addition, with small proba-
bility " > 0 each ￿rm ignores the action prescribed by the imitation rule
and chooses an action at random from all actions in ￿. Let !q denote the
monomorphic state in which all players set the same quantity q.
The adjustment process described above gives rise to a Markov process.
We use methods developed by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) (￿rst applied
in an economic context by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; N￿ldeke and
Samuelson, 1993; and Young, 1993) to identify the set of stochastically stable
states, i.e. states that are in the support of the limit invariant distribution
as the mutation probability " goes to zero.
Let us now assume that some ￿rm k has a cost advantage over all other
￿rms in the market. We model this cost advantage via the ￿xed cost. In
particular and without loss of generality, we assume that fi = 0 for all i 6= k
and ￿fk = g ￿ 0.
4See Apesteguia et al. (2007) for a discussion of various imitation rules.
3Note that if g = 0, i.e. all ￿rms have identical cost functions, a single
mutation towards the Walrasian quantity qw is always imitated by other
￿rms. The simple reason for this is that if price exceeds marginal cost, the
￿rm with the highest quantity makes the largest pro￿t and will be imitated.
If prices are below marginal costs, the ￿rm with the lowest quantity makes
the smallest loss and hence will be imitated. Hence, as shown by Vega￿
Redondo (1997), with identical cost functions only the state in which all
￿rms set the Walrasian quantity is stochastically stable.
If however ￿rm k has a cost advantage, it may be the case that after a
mutation of ￿rm k away from the Walrasian quantity it still earns the highest
pro￿t and hence will be imitated. Other ￿rms, of course, do not realize that
this higher pro￿t is due to the lower ￿xed cost. They simply observe that the
strategy choice of ￿rm k was more successful. This introduces another source
of bounded rationality which pushes the system away from the Walrasian
quantity.
Proposition 1 (1) If there are no di⁄erences in ￿xed cost (g = 0), then
the Walrasian state !qw is the unique stochastically stable state.
(2) For any di⁄erence in ￿xed costs g > 0; there exists a grid size ￿￿
such that for all ￿ < ￿￿, the set of stochastically stable states is given by the
set of all monomorphic states on the grid, f!qjq 2 ￿g.
Proof. The ￿rst part follows without modi￿cation from Vega￿ Redondo
(1997).
With respect to the second part, note that as in Vega￿ Redondo￿ s model,
under the imitate the best rule only monomorphic states are absorbing.
Consider any non-monomorphic state !. Assume that ￿rms make di⁄erent
pro￿ts and say ￿rm j makes the highest pro￿ts. With positive probability
all ￿rms will imitate ￿rm j and we reach the state !qj. Note that there is
also the (non￿ generic) case that ￿rm k and ￿rms i 6= k make the same pro￿ts
but o⁄er di⁄erent quantities. However, since ties are broken randomly, with
positive probability the dynamics will shift us to the state !qj.
We now identify the set of stochastically stable states for arbitrary g and
￿. Consider some monomorphic state !q and assume that ￿rm k mutates
4and decreases its quantity by the smallest possible unit, i.e. ￿rm k mutates
to qk ￿￿. This (downward) mutation will be followed if ￿rm k￿ s pro￿ts after
the mutation exceeds the pro￿ts of the other ￿rms, i.e. if and only if
((a ￿ b(nqk ￿ ￿)) ￿ c)(qk ￿ ￿) + g ￿ ((a ￿ b(nqk ￿ ￿) ￿ c)qk:
So, a single downward mutation is followed if







Note that this implies that the lowest quantity that can be reached by a
chain of single downward mutations is qlow ￿ ￿. Obviously, from all q > qw,
a downward move is always possible, just as in Vega￿ Redondo (1997). But
for g > 0, downward moves become possible for some q < qw as well.
Likewise, note that a single upward mutation qk +￿ of ￿rm k is followed
if







as long as p > 0. Again, we can move up to qhigh + ￿ by a chain of single
mutations.
Consider now the case p = 0, i.e., q ￿ a
bn. An upward mutation is





Note that if qhigh+￿ ￿ a
bn, inequality (4) holds also. That is, if we can move
up to the point where the price is zero, we can move up all the way to the
upper bound of our grid.
Figure 1 summarizes the results so far. All one￿ step mutations toward
qw are always possible. Downward movements for q < qw are possible if and
only if (1) is satis￿ed. Upwards movements for qw < q < a
bn are possible if
and only if (2) is satis￿ed. Upwards movements for q > a







So all states in the following set can be reached from any other state by
a series of single mutations
B =
￿






￿ q ￿ ￿ q
￿





if d < g/c
Figure 1: Transitions from one monomorphic state to a neighboring one that















Hence, all states in B form one large ￿mutation connected component￿ ,
which is stochastically stable (see N￿ldeke and Samuelson, 1993). Note that
as ￿ ! 0 the set B converges to the set f!qjq 2 ￿g.
3 Experimental design
In our experiment, subjects played repeated 3￿ player Cournot games in ￿xed
groups for 60 periods. The payo⁄ function for each round was given by
￿i(qi;q￿i) = p(Q)qi ￿ fi;
with p(Q) = maxf120￿Q;0g being the inverse demand function. Marginal
cost were set to 0.
The grid of quantities was given by ￿ = f20;21;21:5;:::;39:5;40g:5 Note
that the symmetric joint pro￿t maximizing output is at qc = 20, the Cournot
Nash equilibrium output is at qN = 30, and the symmetric Walrasian output
is at qw = 40.
5Quantity 20.5 was excluded to have exactly 40 strategies.
6In order to make imitation salient and give the theoretical results the
best shot, subjects were not told anything about the game￿ s payo⁄ function
apart from the fact that their payo⁄deterministically depended on their own
choice and the choices of the two other subjects in their group, and that the
payo⁄ function was the same throughout all of the experiment. After each
period, subjects learned their own payo⁄, and the actions and payo⁄s of
the two other subjects in their group. The 40 actions in ￿ were labeled as
1;2;:::;40 in ascending order.
We ran two treatments, one symmetric and one asymmetric, that di⁄ered
only in the value of the fi￿ s. In Treatment SYM, there were no ￿xed costs,
fi = 0 for all i. In Treatment ASYM, however, there was a ￿xed bonus for
￿rm 3, g = ￿f3 = 50; while fi = 0 for i = 1;2: This amounts to the same as
having a ￿xed cost of 50 for ￿rms 1 and 2 but has the advantage of avoiding
losses for subjects, which are di¢ cult to enforce in an experiment. Subjects
were not informed about di⁄erences in ￿xed cost in ASYM although they
might have noticed them when all subjects in a group chose the same or
similar actions but realized di⁄erent payo⁄s.
The computerized experiments6 were run in the ELSE laboratory at
UCL. We had 7 independent groups in SYM and 8 in ASYM. In total 45
subjects participated in the experiment, drawn from the student population
at UCL.7 Subjects were paid a show￿ up fee of £5 and in addition to this were
given £0.005 per point won during the experiment. The average payment
was around £11 per subject, including the show-up fee. All sessions lasted
less than 60 minutes.
Given this setup we can derive the following theoretical hypothesis from
Proposition 1.
Hypothesis Q In treatment SYM, the Walrasian quantity qw is the unique
stochastically stable state according to the imitate the best max rule.
However, in treatment ASYM, all monomorphic states !q with 20 <
q ￿ 40 are in the support of the limit invariant distribution and should
6The program was written with z￿ tree of Fischbacher (2007).
7We recruited 8 groups for both treatments but due to no￿ shows, only 7 groups were
complete in SYM.
7be observed with strictly positive probability in the long run.
To obtain quantitative predictions about pro￿ts in the short and medium
run, we have conducted computer simulations that allow for realistic noise
levels. The program followed with probability 1 ￿ " the imitation rule and
chose actions with a uniform distribution from ￿ with probability ". In
10,000 repetitions of 60 periods, pro￿ts were 35.2% higher on average in
ASYM than in SYM for " = 0:2 and 37.8% higher for " = 0:1.8
Hypothesis P Pro￿ts in treatment ASYM are higher than in treatment
SYM.
4 Experimental results
Figure 2 shows relative frequencies of actions separately for our two treat-
ments. The two histograms look remarkably similar and indeed, there
is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the two distributions according to a
Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov test at any conventional signi￿cance level. The mode
of both distributions is at 40, the Walrasian quantity, which is predicted by
theory for SYM but not necessarily for ASYM.
Table 1 shows average quantities and the percentage deviation of average
pro￿ts from the Cournot equilibrium pro￿ts for the two treatments over all
periods.9 Pro￿ts for treatment ASYM are calculated excluding the bonus
of 50 for ￿rm 3.
Table 1: Summary statistics
% deviation from




Note: Pro￿ts in ASYM do not include g:
8Pro￿ts in ASYM are calculated excluding the bonus of 50 for ￿rm 3.
9There is no noticeable time trend in the data.







20 25 30 35 40
quantities
Figure 2: Histograms of individual quantities by treatment.
We ￿nd no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the distributions of average
quantities according to MWU tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) on
the basis of average quantities per group. Likewise, there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence with respect to the deviation from Cournot pro￿ts. However,
for both treatments we observe a sizable deviation from Cournot pro￿ts
towards the zero￿ pro￿t predictions of the competitive equilibrium. This
seems remarkable given the understandable resistance of subjects to remain
near this zero￿ pro￿t area.
We summarize our results as follows.
Result (1) Contrary to the theoretical prediction, there is no signi￿cant
di⁄erence between our SYM and ASYM treatments in terms of quan-
tities. In fact, in both treatments the mode of quantities is at the
competitive quantity of 40.
(2) In both treatments there is a substantial deviation of pro￿ts of
around ￿40% from the Cournot equilibrium pro￿t. We ￿nd no sup-
port for Hypothesis P, which predicts higher pro￿ts in ASYM.
9This leaves us with a puzzle to explain. Although data from treatment
SYM are broadly consistent with theoretical predictions and simulations,
data from treatment ASYM are not. To explain this, we would need a
theory that predicts the same outcome (the Walrasian quantity of 40) in
both treatments.
One possible candidate is relative payo⁄ maximization. It is well known
(see e.g. the survey by Alos-Ferrer and Schlag, 2007) that in a symmet-
ric Cournot oligopoly, the long-run outcome of imitation corresponds to a
￿nite population ESS (Sha⁄er, 1988) and the latter, in turn, is character-
ized by maximization of relative payo⁄s. Interestingly, this correspondence
between imitation and relative payo⁄ maximization breaks down for asym-
metric games.
A Nash equilibrium in a symmetric oligopoly in which players maximize




[￿(q;q￿;q￿) ￿ ￿(q￿;q;q￿)]: (5)
One can easily check that given (1), the unique Nash equilibrium in the game
where relative payo⁄s are maximized is given by the Walrasian quantity
qw. Obviously, adding or subtracting a constant to (5) does not change
the maximizer. Hence ￿xed costs have no in￿ uence on the maximizer and
consequently, the Nash equilibrium of the relative payo⁄ game is at qw = 40
independent of the treatment, SYM or ASYM. Thus, one interpretation of
our data would be that subjects try to maximize their relative payo⁄s. But
this topic certainly requires further study and experiments.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the fragility and robustness of the prediction in Vega-
Redondo￿ s imitation theory (1997). If agents can observe their rivals and
imitate the action that in the previous round was most successful, Wal-
rasian outcomes emerge in the long run. However, as we show, this does
no longer hold if there are di⁄erences in costs, even if these di⁄erences are
very small. Intuitively, one would think that such a fragility would severely
10limit the theory￿ s predictive power. But intuition is wrong. Despite its
theoretical fragility, the link between information about rivals and intense
competition is robust. Di⁄erences in costs do not help subjects to overcome
cut-throat competition. Whether this is due to imitation or to relative payo⁄
maximization requires further study. But the result stresses the behavioral
importance of information about rivals that orthodox game theory deems
irrelevant.
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Appendix: Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. Do
not talk with others and remain quiet during the entire experiment. If you
have any questions, please ask us. We will come to you and answer your
question privately.
During this experiment, which lasts for 60 rounds, you will be able to
earn points in every round. You will form a group with two other partic-
ipants. The composition of your group remains constant throughout the
12course of the experiment. The number of points you may earn depends on
your action and the actions of the two other participants in your group.
At the end of the experiment your accumulated points will be converted to
pound sterling at a rate of 200 : 1.
Each round, you will have to choose one of 40 di⁄erent actions, actions
1;2;3;:::;40. Actions are ordered such that action 1 is the smallest and
action 40 is the largest action. We are not going to tell you how your payo⁄
is calculated, but in every round your payo⁄ depends uniquely on your own
decision and the decisions of the two other participants in your group. The
rule underlying the calculation of the payo⁄ does not depend on chance and
remains the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with
your action in the current round. In addition, you will receive information
about the actions of the other two participants in your group, and how many
points each of them earned.
After the last period you will be reminded of all your 60 payo⁄s and the
computer will calculate the sum of these which will then be converted into
pound sterling.
These are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now.
Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
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